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INTRODUCTION
United States penitentiaries housed 2,224,400 prisoners in 2014.1
This prison population suffers from higher rates of mental illness,
chronic medical conditions, and infectious diseases compared with the
general United States population2 due to factors such as substance and
alcohol abuse, poverty, and poor preventative healthcare. More than
eight in ten prisoners receive medical care after becoming
incarcerated.3 The most recent data shows prison health care spending

 J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Economics and English, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, 2014.
1
Danielle Kaeble, et. al, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2014,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Dec. 2015, Revised Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus14.pdf.
2
Karishma A. Chari, et. al, National Survey of Prison Health Care: Selected
Findings, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP. 26 (July 28, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr096.pdf.
3
Laura M. Maruschak, Medical Problems of Prisoners, BUREAU JUST. STAT.
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/mpp/mpp.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).
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totaling $7.7 billion in 2011, a reduction from previous years.4
Medically-related costs for guarding and transporting one inmate can
exceed $2000 per day.5 The ever-growing prison population and
increased risk of health complications has renewed national concern
for the quality of prison healthcare.6
A constitutional violation may arise under the Eighth Amendment
if a prisoner’s medical treatment, or lack thereof, is found to constitute
“cruel and unusual punishment.”7 However, claims of deficient
medical care do not always constitute Eighth Amendment claims.8
Negligence in diagnosis or medical treatment, normally addressed in
medical malpractice actions, does not become a constitutional
violation simply because the victim is a prisoner.9
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Estelle v. Gamble,
developed the “deliberate indifference” standard to analyze whether
medical treatment of a prisoner rises to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation.10 To establish deliberate indifference, a court
must first find that the plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious
medical condition.11 Then, the court will analyze whether the
4

State Prison Health Care Spending: An Examination, PEW CHARITABLE TR.
& MACARTHUR FOUND. (July 2014),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/07/stateprisonhealthcarespendingrepo
rt.pdf.
5
Id.
6
See Matthew Clark, 60% of Louisiana Prison Doctors Disciplined by Medical
Board, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/aug/10/60-louisiana-prison-doctorsdisciplined-medical-board/; Danny Robins, Georgia Hires Prison Doctors with
Troubled Pasts, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Dec. 13, 2014),
http://www.myajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/georgia-hires-prisondoctors-with-troubled-pasts/njP8B/, Jo Becker, Many Prison Doctors Have Troubled
Past, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Sep. 27, 1999),
http://www.sptimes.com/News/92799/State/Many_prison_doctors_h.shtml.
7
See U.S. Const. amend. VIII, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976).
8
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
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defendant knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to the prisoner’s
health.12 To show this, the defendant must: 1) have been aware of facts
from which she could infer the existence of a substantial risk of
serious harm and 2) have actually drawn that inference.13 Even
objective recklessness—failing to act in the face of an unjustifiably
high risk that is so obvious that it should be known—is insufficient to
support an Eighth Amendment violation.14
Circuits are split on exactly what physician behavior constitutes
deliberate indifference.15 In Petties v. Carter, Tyrone Petties, a
prisoner, argued that Dr. Imhotep Carter was deliberately indifferent
when he failed to give Petties a foot splint and promptly arrange an
appointment with a specialist. In not prescribing a splint, Petties
argued, Dr. Carter exacerbated the injury. Dr. Carter, on the other
hand, argued that although he was aware that the protocol for treating
a ruptured Achilles tendon recommended use of a splint, he used his
professional judgment in deciding to immobilize Petties’ foot through
use of crutches while also approving lay-in meals16 and a lower bunk
assignment. In a 6-3 decision, following a rehearing en banc, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. The
majority reasoned that even if Dr. Carter denied knowing that he was
exposing Petties to a substantial risk of serious harm, there was
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Dr.
Carter knew he was providing deficient treatment and, consequently,
summary judgment was not appropriate.17 The dissent argued that a
decision to provide palliative medical treatment suffices under Eighth
Amendment standards even if the treatment was not ideal and,
12

Id.
Id. at 837.
14
Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 25,
2016) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-38).
15
Estelle, 429 U.S. at n. 14.
16
Lay-in meals enabled Petties to eat his meals in his cell, as opposed to
risking further injury by walking to and from the cafeteria. Petties, 836 F.3d at 726.
17
Id.
13
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therefore, Petties should pursue any claim of deficient medical
treatment under state medical malpractice law.18
This article will analyze the soundness of the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in light of precedent and public policy. Part I contains the
legal standards applicable to claims of insufficient medical care
brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the legal differences between
these claims and state-law medical malpractice claims. Part II
discusses the factual and procedural background of Petties v. Carter.
Part III argues that physicians who show a reasonable response to risk
should be shielded from liability at the summary judgment stage. It
further argues that public policy reasons support respect for casespecific decisions by medical professionals, and concludes that
standard claims of deficient medical care should be addressed under
state medical malpractice law.
BACKGROUND AND STANDARDS
The Supreme Court has found that the government has a duty
to provide medical care for those it is punishing through
incarceration.19 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for
prisoners allegedly subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment.20
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Medical Malpractice
A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not
always constitute an Eighth Amendment claim.21 Medical
malpractice claims alleging negligence in diagnosis or treatment
of a medical condition are not transformed into Eighth

18

Petties, 836 F.3d at 734 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
20
U.S. Const. amend. VIII; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
21
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
19
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Amendment claims simply because the victim is a prisoner.22
Courts agree that mere allegations of malpractice do not support
an Eighth Amendment violation. However, the exact distinction
between medical malpractice law and Eighth Amendment
violations in the medical context is less clear.
State law medical malpractice is designed to assess a claim of
professional negligence through a peer-reviewed evidentiary
standard.23 In most jurisdictions, a claim for medical malpractice
must be supported by the opinion of an expert licensed in the
same field of medicine.24 This opinion must set out the standard
of care required, the care actually provided, how the standard of
care was violated, and how the violation damaged the plaintiff.25
In addition to state law medical malpractice claims,
physicians treating prisoners are vulnerable to Eighth Amendment
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983.26 The practical differences
between these two types of claims are considerable. An Eighth
Amendment claim does not require the support of an expert, thus
avoiding significant costs at the pleading stage.27 Further, whereas
in most states medical malpractice claims impose a cap on
damages and prohibit punitive damages, Eighth Amendment
claims have no such cap or prohibition.28 In fact, a successful
Eighth Amendment claim entitles the plaintiff to recover
22

Id. at 106.
See B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United
States, CLIN. ORTHOP. RELAT RES. 467(2): 339-347 (2009).
24
See B. Sonny Bal, The Expert Witness in Medical Malpractice Litigation,
CLIN. ORTHOP. RELAT RES. 467(2): 383-391.
25
See e.g., Chapman Law Group, The Difference Between a Medical
Malpractice Claim and a Deliberate Indifference (42 § USC 1983 Civil Rights)
Claim, CHAPMAN LAW GROUP BLOG (Jan. 23, 2015)
http://chapmanlawgroup.com/medicalmalpractice_1983civilrights/.
26
42 U.S.C. §1983.
27
See Joel H. Thompson, Today's Deliberate Indifference: Providing Attention
Without Providing Treatment to Prisoners with Serious Medical Needs, 45 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 635, 651-52 (2010).
28
See Chapman Law Group, supra note 25.
23
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attorneys’ fees in addition to compensatory damages.29 Finally,
some medical malpractice insurance policies and contracts
between prisons and private healthcare groups do not cover
liability or indemnification for willful, wanton, or intentional acts,
and thus will not cover a judgment against a physician under 42
U.S.C. §1983.30
Decreased litigation costs and the prospect of uncapped
damages create an attractive incentive for prisoners to file under
42 U.S.C. §1983 rather than under medical malpractice law in
state court. This hypothetically increases the number of lawsuits
filed under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against prison physicians as
compared to alternative actions under state medical malpractice
law. The enhanced potential to be named in a civil suit coupled
with personal liability for judgments under 42 U.S.C. §1983
creates a hazard for health professionals who provide services in
prisons. Given this, the courts attempt to balance this disincentive
by requiring a higher burden of proof for alleged Eighth
Amendment violations.31 Plaintiffs filing under 42 U.S.C. §1983
must prove “deliberate indifference,” a significantly higher burden
of proof than ordinary medical negligence.32
B. History of Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In establishing the constitutional prohibition against “cruel and
unusual punishment,” the primary concern of the drafters was to
29

See 42 U.S.C. §1988.
See e.g., Chapman Law Group, supra note 25; Eliot M. Harris, The Duty To
Defend: What Insurers, Insureds And Their Counsel Need To Know When Faced
With A Liability Coverage Dispute - ABA YLD 101 Practice Series, A.B.A. Young
Lawyers Division,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_pract
ice_series/duty.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2016); AHC Media, Not all claims
covered by med/mal policies, https://www.ahcmedia.com/articles/64652-not-allclaims-covered-by-med-mal-policies (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
31
See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
32
42 U.S.C. §1983.
30
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prevent torture and other barbarous methods of punishment.33 Initially,
the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment was
limited to a strict interpretation of the phrase.34 Courts, for example,
declined to extend Eighth Amendment claims to arguments that
sentences were disproportionate to their crimes.35 However, in 1910,
the Supreme Court extended Eighth Amendment protections beyond
torture and barbarous acts, finding that the protection included
excessive punishment.36 In extending the interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment, the Court said, “a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”37 Thus, the
Eighth Amendment has become a subject of progressive interpretation,
closely linked to societal views on prison conditions, ethical
punishment and human dignity.38
Prison officials have a duty to provide medical treatment to a
prisoner “who cannot, by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care
for himself.”39 Punishment by imprisonment coupled with deprivation
of medical care results in a punishment in excess of the sentence, and
this may constitute cruel and unusual punishment.40 It is clear that the
Eighth Amendment prevents affirmative punishment and lack of
treatment which is “shocking to the conscience.”41 Yet, it is unclear
what level of medical care beyond a total deprivation of treatment is
constitutionally required.

33

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102; Stuart Klein, Prisoners’ Rights to Physical and
Mental Health Care: A Modern Expansion of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, 7 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1, 3 (1978).
34
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102; Klein, supra note 33.
35
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102; Klein, supra note 33.
36
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
37
Id. at 373, Klein, supra note 33.
38
Klein, supra note 33.
39
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
40
Klein, supra note 33.
41
Id.
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Courts began analyzing constitutionally permissible treatment in
prisons in light of “evolving standards of decency.”42 Due to the
vagueness of this guideline, different standards were proposed and
adopted for analyzing claims of cruel and unusual punishment
resulting from inadequate medical care.43 Proposed standards included
“abuse of discretion,” “deprivation of basic elements of adequate
medical treatment,” and “deliberate indifference.”44
The Supreme Court, in Estelle v. Gamble, settled on the standard
of “deliberate indifference.”45 The Court explicitly rejected the Fourth
Circuit’s broader standard of “reasonable care.”46 Instead, the Estelle
Court reasoned that “in order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner
must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such
indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.”47
Estelle involved a prisoner, J. W. Gamble, who was engaged in
prison work when a bale of cotton fell on him.48 He experienced
immediate and on-going pain, and was seen by a prison physician.49
The physician prescribed a pain reliever, a muscle relaxant, and in-cell
meals.50 Gamble nevertheless continued to complain of pain.51 He was
subject to administrative segregation for refusing to work due to the
42

Klein, supra note 33.
Klein, supra note 33.
44
See Flint v. Wainwright, 433 F.2d 961(5th Cir. 1970); Campbell v. Beto, 460
F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1972); Klein, supra note 33.
45
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976).
46
Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1969); Klein, supra note 33.
47
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“A complaint must allege that medical treatment
provided was not supported by any competent, recognized school of medical
practice, and that the treatment was a denial of medical care. However, short of this,
the prisoner is left to his state tort remedies.”).
48
See generally Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 97-116.
49
Id. at 99-101.
50
Id.
51
Id.
43
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pain.52 Gamble visited prison physicians seventeen times within a
three-month period.53
The District Court dismissed Gamble’s complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.54 The Court of
Appeals, however, found that the alleged insufficiency of the medical
treatment required reinstatement of the complaint.55 The Supreme
Court resolved the dispute by finding that while deliberate indifference
to a prisoner’s serious medical condition constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Gamble’s
complaint was insufficient to state a cause of action.56
Gamble contended that more should have been done for him by
way of diagnosis and treatment—there were a number of medical
treatment options that were not pursued.57 Yet, the Court held that the
decision not to order additional diagnostic techniques or forms of
treatment is a medical decision, and such a decision is not cruel and
unusual punishment.58 Furthermore, inadvertent failure to provide
adequate medical treatment does not constitute “unnecessary and
wanton infliction” and is not “repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.”59 The Estelle Court made an effort to distinguish medical
malpractice from Eighth Amendment violations by pointing out that
claims of medical malpractice do not become a constitutional violation
merely because the victim is a prisoner.60
The Court revisited the deliberate indifference standard in Farmer
v. Brennan.61 In Farmer, a transsexual inmate accused prison officials
of being deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of sexual
52

Id. at 100.
Id. at 107.
54
Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 98.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 104.
57
Id. at 107.
58
Id.
59
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-6.
60
Id.
61
See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
53
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violence against him62 while in the penitentiary.63 Though this case did
not involve medical treatment by a physician, the Court followed the
same line of analysis. The Court clarified that a constitutional
violation occurs only where the deprivation alleged is objectively
serious,64 and the prison official has acted with “deliberate
indifference” to inmate health or safety.65 Courts will therefore analyze
the seriousness of the alleged deprivation objectively, but the Supreme
Court expressly rejected an objective test for determining deliberate
indifference.66 Instead, the Court clarified that an Eighth Amendment
violation requires proof that an official was both aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and, in fact, drew that inference.67 Under this standard, an
official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that she should have
perceived but failed to perceive is not an infliction of punishment.68
Importantly, an official who actually knew of a substantial risk to
inmate health may be found free from liability if she responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not ultimately averted.69
PETTIES V. CARTER
A. The Facts
In January 2012, Tyrone Petties was walking up the stairs in
Stateville prison when he suffered a rupture in his Achilles tendon.70
62

Dee Farmer, biologically born a male, took several medical steps to
transition but ultimately did not complete sex reassignment. Pronouns referencing
Farmer correspond with those used by the Court in order to avoid confusion.
63
Id. at 829.
64
Id. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 837.
67
Id.
68
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.
69
Id. at 844.
70
Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 25,
2016).
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https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/4

10

Sweeney: Reasonable Response: The Achilles' Heel of the Seventh Circuit's

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

He had previously suffered a partial rupture in his Achilles tendon in
2010, which had not fully healed.71 A rupture in the Achilles tendon is
a tear, which causes great pain and limits mobility.72 Walking on the
ruptured tendon increases the tear, and thus exacerbates the injury and
pain.73 Immobilization of the foot prevents further tearing and allows
scar tissue to form.74
Dr. Imhotep Carter was medical director of Stateville’s heath
clinic, though he was employed by Wexford Health Sources, a private
contractor of medical services to correctional facilities.75 Dr. Carter’s
role in Stateville’s health clinic was to implement Wexford’s medical
policies and procedures.76 Wexford’s protocol for ruptured Achilles
tendons specified that patients receive a splint, crutches, antibiotics if
there were lacerations to the site of injury, and a follow-up with a
specialist for further treatment.77
Petties was first seen by a physician in the prison infirmary who
noted tenderness and abnormal reflex in the left Achilles tendon.78 He
observed that Petties could not bear weight on that foot.79 He
prescribed Vicodin and crutches and authorized lay-in meals so that
Petties did not have to walk to and from the cafeteria.80 Later that
same day, Petties was seen by Dr. Carter, who opined that Petties had
suffered an Achilles tendon rupture.81 He directed that Petties be
scheduled for an MRI and examination by an orthopedist, noting that

71

Id.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Petties, 836 F.3d at 726.
77
Id.
78
Petties v. Carter, 795 F.3d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 2015), reh'g granted, 836 F.3d
722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Petties, 836 F.3d at 726.
72
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these additional steps were “urgent.”82 However, the appointment with
the orthopedist did not take place for almost six weeks.83 Dr. Carter
later alleged that the delay was due to security issues.84
Despite Wexford’s protocol for ruptured Achilles tendons, Dr.
Carter did not provide Petties with a splint. At a follow-up
appointment, Petties complained of increased pain.85 Dr. Carter
renewed prescriptions for crutches, pain medication, lay-in meals, and
assignments to a lower bunk.86 Dr. Carter still did not prescribe a
splint.87
In March 2012, Petties had an MRI which confirmed the
diagnosis of Achilles tendon rupture.88 A week later, he saw an
orthopedic specialist, Dr. Anuj Puppala, who noted that the lack of a
cast was potentially creating a gap at the tendon rupture site.89 He gave
Petties an orthopedic boot to prevent further gapping and to alleviate
pain.90 Due to the gapping, Dr. Puppala thought that surgery might be
necessary.91 He referred Petties to an ankle specialist.92 Petties
returned to Stateville where he was again seen by Dr. Carter.93 Dr.
Carter authorized use of the boot, along with crutches, ice, and lower
bunk assignment.94 Petties alleged that Dr. Carter said he would not
order surgery because it was too costly.95
82

Petties v. Carter, 795 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015), reh'g granted, 836 F.3d
722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). [CAN SHORT CITE SINCE CITE TO THIS CASE IS LESS
THAN 5 CITES AGO]
83

Petties, 836 F.3d at 726.
Id. at 733.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 727.
89
Petties, 836 F.3d at 727.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Petties, 836 F.3d at 727.
84
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In July 2012, Petties saw an ankle specialist, Dr. Samuel
Chmell.96 Dr. Chmell prescribed a second MRI, physical therapy,
stretching exercises, and follow-up treatment.97
In August 2012, Dr. Carter was replaced by Wexford employee
Dr. Saleh Obaisi.98 Dr. Obaisi approved the order for a second MRI.
He did not authorize physical therapy.99 Petties alleged that Dr. Obaisi
also said that surgery was too expensive.100
In September 2012, Petties had his second MRI, which showed a
partial tear in his tendon, but indicated some healing.101 Yet, Petties
complained of continued pain.102 Dr. Obaisi prescribed Tylenol, a low
bunk permit, and continued use of a boot.103 Dr. Obaisis renewed
prescriptions for the low bunk permit and boot in November and the
following June.104 Petties alleged that he experienced continued pain
as late as March 2014.105
B. District Court Opinion
In November 2012, Petties filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Dr. Carter and Dr. Obaisi.106 Petties alleged that Dr. Carter and
Dr. Obaisi acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.107 The district court granted summary judgment for both
defendants.108 The court reasoned that Dr. Carter’s decision to wait
96

Id.
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Petties, 836 F.3d at 727.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Petties, 836 F.3d at 727.
108
Id.
97
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eight weeks before prescribing a boot or splint could not have
constituted deliberate indifference because the various physicians that
Petties had seen in and out of the prison infirmary held different
opinions about whether a boot or splint was necessary in Petties
case.109 The court further found that a reasonable jury could not find
that Dr. Obaisi’s rejection of recommendation for physical therapy
constituted deliberate indifference because Petties had learned
physical therapy exercises from his previous injury and could have
performed those on his own.110
C. Appeal to Seventh Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, rehearing this case
en banc, reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, “viewing the record in the light most favorable to Petties, and
drawing all inferences in his favor.”111
The majority considered “when a doctor’s rationale for his
treatment decisions supports a triable issue as to whether that doctor
acted with deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.”112
They reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
concluding that, “even if a doctor denies knowing that he was
exposing a plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm, evidence
from which a reasonable jury could infer a doctor knew he was
providing deficient treatment is sufficient to survive summary
judgment.”113

109

Petties v. Carter, 795 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2015), reh'g granted, 836 F.3d
722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
110
Id.
111
Petties, 836 F.3d at 727.
112
Id. at 726.
113
Id.
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1. Judge Williams’ Majority Opinion
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Petties, the
majority found that Petties produced sufficient evidence for a jury to
conclude that the doctors knew the care they were providing was
insufficient.114 Judge Williams quoted the Supreme Court’s decision in
Farmer v. Brennan stating: “The Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones.”115
Judge Williams acknowledged that not all claims of inadequate
medical treatment are Eighth Amendment claims.116 Citing Farmer,
Judge Williams suggested that in determining Eighth Amendment
violations in the “prison medical context,” the Court performs a twostep analysis.117 First, the Court examines whether a plaintiff suffered
an objectively serious medical condition.118 Then, the Court
determines whether the individual defendant was deliberately
indifferent to that condition.119 Generally, litigation arises over the
second line of analysis.
In analyzing the first step, the parties agreed that an Achilles
tendon rupture was an objectively serious condition.120 Therefore, the
Court was left to analyze whether the defendants acted with deliberate
indifference.121 The Court began this analysis by looking to the
defendant’s subjective state of mind.122 Judge Williams reiterated that
mere negligence, and even objective recklessness, would not be
enough.123 Further, the defendants in this case could successfully

114

Id.
Id. at 727.
116
Id.
117
Petties, 836 F.3d at 728.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Petties, 836 F.3d at 728.
115
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avoid liability by proving they were unaware of even an obvious risk
to Petties’ health or safety.124
Judge Williams pointed out that proof of actual knowledge in
these cases is rare. Because of this, she suggested that a narrower
question faced the court: How bad does an inmate’s care have to be to
create a reasonable inference from circumstantial evidence that a
doctor was aware of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm?125
Judge Williams concluded from precedent that deliberate indifference
can be found where medical judgment is “such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on
such a judgment.”126 This can be shown through proof that “no
minimally competent professional would have so responded under
those circumstances.”127 Yet, evidence that merely some medical
professionals would have chosen a different course of treatment is
insufficient to make out a constitutional claim.128
Judge Williams acknowledged the difficulty in proving a
substantial departure from accepted professional standards due to the
nature of medical judgments being patient and fact-specific.129
Because of this, it is hard to draw a line between poor medical
judgment and deliberate indifference.130 Judge Williams examined
cases which have attempted to draw this line and pointed to a Tenth
Circuit case finding deliberate indifference when a doctor fails to
follow an existing protocol.131 She concluded by finding that the
following situations can amount to deliberate indifference: 1) a
departure from minimally competent medical judgment where a prison
124

Id.
Id.
126
Id. at 729.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Petties, 836 F.3d at 729 (citing Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir.
1996)).
130
Petties, 836 F.3d at 729.
131
Id.
125
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official persists in a course of treatment known to be ineffective, 2)
where a prison doctor chooses an “easier and less efficacious
treatment” without exercising professional judgment, 3) an
inexplicable delay in treatment which serves no penological interest.132
In response to the dissent’s anticipated argument, Judge Williams
asserted that the Court has repeatedly rejected the idea that simply
providing some medical care means that the physician has met the
basic requirements of the Eighth Amendment.133 She argued that a jury
is entitled to weigh a physician’s claim that he lacked knowledge that
his treatment decisions could cause harm against clues that the doctor
did in fact know.134 Judge Williams suggested the policy consideration
that allowing physicians’ claims of ignorance to immunize them from
liability would allow a free pass to ignore prisoners’ medical needs.135
Specifically in regard to Petties’ case, Judge Williams found there
to be sufficient evidence that Dr. Carter acted with deliberate
indifference when he 1) failed to immobilize Petties’ ruptured tendon
for six weeks, 2) delayed Petties’ appointment with a specialist, and 3)
refused to order surgery to repair the tendon.136 This finding was based
on evidence including the deposition testimonies of Dr. Carter, Dr.
Puppala and Dr. Chmell. Judge Williams concluded that this
established a reasonable inference that Dr. Carter knew that failing to
immobilize an Achilles rupture would result in further pain and injury
to Petties.137 Judge Williams acknowledged that some of Dr. Carter’s
testimony suggested that he believed crutches served the same purpose
as a boot.138 Yet, ultimately she found this to be a triable issue where a
jury could reasonably infer from conflicting testimony that Dr. Carter
acted with deliberate indifference.139
132

Id. at 729-30.
Id. at 731.
134
Id.
135
Petties, 836 F.3d at 731.
136
Id. at 731.
137
Id. at 732.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 726, 732.
133
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In addition to the immobilization issue, Petties asserted that Dr.
Carter was responsible for the delay in treatment by a specialist.140
Judge Williams found this issue of whether the delay was the result of
negligence or deliberate indifference to be a question for the jury.141
Further, Judge Williams found that if a jury were to believe that Dr.
Carter cited cost as the reason for refusing treatment, a jury could
similarly find deliberate indifference.142
Regarding Dr. Obaisi, Judge Williams found that his testimony
was at odds with the evidence in this case.143 She concluded that a jury
was entitled to determine whether Dr. Obaisi was “deliberately
indifferent, rather than simply incompetent.”144
2. Judge Easterbrook’s Dissent
Judge Easterbrook began his dissent by characterizing his
colleagues’ understanding as being that “the Constitution entitled
Petties to an orthopedic boot” immediately after his injury.145 He
argued that the appropriate analysis in this case should instead begin
with the question: Was there a cruel and unusual punishment?146 Only
after finding a cruel and unusual punishment should the courts analyze
the defendant’s mental state.147 Judge Easterbrook pointed out that the
Supreme Court’s only decision addressing palliative medical treatment
under the Eighth Amendment is Estelle v. Gamble.148 Judge
Easterbrook defined palliative medical treatment to mean pain relief
without an effort at cure.149
140

Id.
Petties, 836 F.3d at 732-33.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 733.
144
Id.
145
Petties, 836 F.3d at 734 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
141

79
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/4

18

Sweeney: Reasonable Response: The Achilles' Heel of the Seventh Circuit's

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

Judge Easterbrook asserted that the Fifth Circuit in Estelle, prior
to the Supreme Court’s decision, interpreted the constitution to require
not only palliation, but also a medically competent effort to cure.150
The Supreme Court reversed that finding, instead holding that the
plaintiff received care and thus there was no Eighth Amendment
violation.151 Judge Easterbrook reiterated that despite the wretched
care that the plaintiff received, Supreme Court precedent dictated that
claims based on deficient care are to be addressed through state
medical-malpractice law.152
Finding support in Estelle, Judge Easterbrook therefore concluded
that Petties was provided with medical care.153 Judge Easterbrook
noted that Petties was provided with more, and better, care than
Gamble received; and yet, even Gamble’s claim for deficient medical
care was defeated at the summary judgment stage.154 Judge
Easterbrook contended that Farmer stands for the proposition that a
constitutional claim is supported when no response is provided for a
serious medical condition, and the actors are deliberately
indifferent.155 Beyond this, Estelle allows legal action for harmful
interventions.156 However, Petties did not claim that he received no
care, and did not claim that the care he received was harmful as
compared with no care at all.157
Judge Easterbrook suggested that one way to distinguish medical
malpractice from a constitutional violation would be to determine
whether the prison official exercised medical judgment.158 Again,
citing Estelle, Judge Easterbrook argued that Petties did not deny that
the defendants exercised medical judgment, but rather Petties asserted
150

Id. at 735.
Petties, 836 F.3d at 735 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Petties, 836 F.3d at 735 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
158
Id.
151
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that their judgment was poor.159 Since Estelle held that poor medical
care must fall under medical malpractice law, Judge Easterbrook
contends that Petties’ claim must be addressed through a medical
malpractice action.160
Judge Easterbrook concluded by pointing to the circuit split on the
issue of whether a prisoner received some treatment in contrast to the
issue of whether the treatment was inferior.161 Finally, Judge
Easterbrook urged that courts consider the implications of federalizing
the law of medical malpractice before finding a “competent medical
judgment” standard in the Constitution.162
ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit majority opinion incorrectly decided Petties
v. Carter because it failed to appropriately consider a critical Supreme
Court precedent finding that prison officials can avoid liability by
demonstrating a reasonable response to risk.163 By failing to take into
account evidence suggesting a reasonable medical response to Petties,
the Seventh Circuit arrived at the wrong conclusion. Precedent and
public policy demand an analysis of the totality of medical care when
assessing whether an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate
indifference ought to survive summary judgment.
To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff pursuing an Eighth
Amendment claim must allege an objectively serious medical
condition.164 A plaintiff must also show facts from which a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the prison official knew of and
disregarded a substantial risk to the prisoner’s health.165
Notwithstanding these allegations (taken in the light most favorable to
159

Id. at 735-36.
Id. at 736.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994).
164
See id.
165
See id.
160
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the plaintiff), a defendant may be found free from liability if she
responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was, in the end, not
averted.166 It therefore follows that if there is no factual dispute that a
defendant responded reasonably to the risk, despite the eventual harm,
the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A. The Seventh Circuit Failed to Consider Physicians’ Reasonable
Response to Risk
Petties’ objectively serious medical condition was the twocentimeter gap at the site of his already ruptured Achilles tendon.167
Wexford’s protocol for treating ruptured Achilles tendons was use of a
splint, crutches, antibiotics if there were lacerations to the site of
injury, and an appointment with a specialist.168 Dr. Carter approved the
use of crutches, ice, and pain medication, and authorized lay-in meals,
an assignment to a lower bunk and a referral to an orthopedist.169
Petties alleged that he did not receive a splint, and was not seen by the
orthopedist in an adequate amount of time following his injury.170 The
orthopedist opined that surgery might be necessary.171 Yet, Petties
alleged that Dr. Carter and Dr. Obaisi would not authorize surgery for
Petties due to cost concerns.172 The Seventh Circuit therefore
concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude that the doctors knew the care that they were providing was
insufficient.173 However, the Seventh Circuit cut their analysis short by
failing to fully consider precedent set forth in Farmer v. Brennan,

166

See id.
Petties v. Carter, 795 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015), reh'g granted, 836 F.3d
722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
168
Petties, 836 F.3d at 726.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 727.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 726.
167
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which demands consideration of the physician’s response to an alleged
risk.174
The Seventh Circuit is committed to examining the totality of an
inmate’s medical care when considering whether that care reflects
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.175 Where a prisoner
alleges a few isolated incidents of delay or neglect during a course of
treatment, but it is clear that the defendant provided meaningful
treatment throughout the inmate’s recovery and thus did not disregard
a serious medical risk, the Seventh Circuit has held that the defendant
has not acted with deliberate indifference.176 Proving disregard of a
substantial risk requires showing that a medical professional’s
treatment decisions are “such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the
person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment.”177
But mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment is not
enough to prove deliberate indifference.178 In upholding the
commitment to examine the totality of an inmate’s medical care, this
standard cannot be fairly examined without assessing the
reasonableness of the physician’s response to the existing risk.
Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Petties,
Wexford’s protocol for treatment of Achilles tendon ruptures was met
by the defendant doctors except for use of a splint, and delay in

174

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994).
Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2003); Dunigan ex rel.
Nyman v. Winnebago County, 165 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1999). See also Gutierrez
v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1375 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that isolated instances of
neglect “cannot support a finding of deliberate indifference”).
176
See Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 2000); Dunigan ex rel.
Nyman v. Winnebago Cnty., 165 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1999); Gutierrez v. Peters,
111 F.3d 1364, 1375 (7th Cir. 1997).
177
Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1996).
178
Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir.2010); Johnson v. Doughty,
433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006); Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 397 (7th
Cir. 2006).
175
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arranging an appointment with an orthopedist.179 The majority in
Petties relied upon a Tenth Circuit decision in contending that Dr.
Carter’s failure to follow protocol and immobilize Petties’ foot with a
splint provided circumstantial evidence that he knew of a substantial
risk of serious harm.180 Indeed, Dr. Carter did not contest the risk
posed by failing to immobilize Petties’ foot.181 Yet, he contended that
he addressed that risk in a way supported by Petties’ unique case and
backed by Dr. Carter’s medical training and experience.182 Dr. Carter
testified, on the basis of his professional opinion as well as on the
basis of having been the treating physician for Petties’ specific injury,
that crutches and other immobilization accommodations served the
same purpose as a splint.183 Petties alleged that Dr. Carter failed to
meet Wexford’s protocol for treating an Achilles tendon rupture, and
thus exacerbated Petties’ injury.184 Yet, Dr. Carter went beyond the
protocol to treat Petties’ individual case by authorizing lay-in meals
and a lower bunk assignment.185
Further, despite deeming it a jury question and finding it
supportive of an Eighth Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion failed to identify any evidence suggesting that Dr. Carter was
179

2016).

Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 25,

180

Id. at 729 (citing Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745 (10th Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 731 (“He explained the purpose of immobilization, stating, “in the
acute phase of healing, you are generating an immune system response in the body,”
and when asked if keeping the tendon in one place enables this healing process to go
forward favorably, he replied, “Correct. And if you're continuously injuring it, it
hinders that process.”).
182
See id. at 732 (“Some of his testimony suggests that he believed crutches
served the same purpose as a boot.”); Petties v. Carter, 795 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir.
2015), reh'g granted, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). (“Although Dr. Carter
acknowledged that treatment for a complete Achilles tear typically includes
immobilizing the ankle to minimize putting weight on the ankle, he also explained
that he did not employ a splint initially because he believed that giving Petties
crutches and minimizing his time on his feet was an effective treatment plan.”).
183
Id.
184
Petties, 836 F.3d at 726.
185
See id.
181
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responsible for an intentional delay regarding Petties’ appointment
with the orthopedist.186 On the contrary, Dr. Carter had directed, upon
initially seeing Petties, that he be scheduled for an MRI and
examination by an orthopedist, characterizing these orders as
“urgent.”187 The majority found fault in Dr. Carter’s failure to issue an
“emergency override” in Petties’ case. However, the majority failed to
indicate a basis under which Petties, or any prisoner, is entitled to an
“emergency override.”188 Consequently, the majority’s argument as to
the delay in treatment by a specialist fell significantly short of
establishing a basis for finding “cruel and unusual punishment.”
The issue facing the Seventh Circuit should have been
whether Dr. Carter’s use of other immobilization methods – aside from
a splint – constituted a reasonable response, even if exacerbation of the
injury was, in the end, not avoided. Considering the totality of Petties’
care, it is hard to imagine a reasonable fact finder concluding that Dr.
Carter’s treatment plan was so unreasonable that it amounted to cruel
and unusual punishment.
B. Public Policy Supports Respect for Case-Specific Medical
Judgment, and Deferral to State Medical Malpractice Remedies
Both the majority and dissent in Petties reiterated the importance
of case-specific medical judgment and availability of treatments.189
Further, the American College of Physicians Ethics Manual sets out
ethical considerations for the care of prisoners, emphasizing a
physician’s ultimate responsibility to care for the individual patient.190
This professional standard of care places significant weight on the
186

See id. at 733.
Petties v. Carter, 795 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015), reh'g granted, 836 F.3d
722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
188
20 Ill. Admin. Code § 415.30 (No discussion of policy of issuing
emergency overrides).
189
Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 25,
2016) (citing Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2011)).
190
AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS ETHICS MANUAL 6TH ED., www.acponline.org
(last visited Nov. 21, 2016).
187
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physician’s medical judgment in her capacity as a certified health care
professional.191 Though professional judgment may vary from one
physician to the next in treatment of the same patient, a physician’s
ethical obligations are fulfilled by the honest commitment to treat the
patient in the way she deems most medically beneficial to the
patient.192 The law reflects this ethical standard by finding evidence
that some medical professionals would have pursued a different course
of treatment insufficient to support a claim of deliberate
indifference.193 However, as interpreted by the Seventh Circuit in
Petties v. Carter, the “deliberate indifference” standard in some cases
might demand more than a physician’s ethical obligations.194
Forgoing authorization for a splint in favor of other treatment
options designed to immobilize the foot, such as crutches, lay-in
meals, and lower bunk authorization, is a professional medical
judgment. Yet, the majority in Petties suggested that Dr. Carter’s
conscious, professional decision to exclude use of a splint, despite the
variety of other treatments prescribed, could lead a reasonable jury to
conclude that withholding the splint constituted “cruel and unusual
punishment” and that Dr. Carter was deliberately indifferent to the
pain of Petties’ ruptured Achilles tendon by doing so.195 But Supreme
Court precedent is clear in stating: “the question whether an X-ray or
additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment is indicated is a
classic example of a matter for medical judgment. A medical decision
not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and
unusual punishment. At most it is medical malpractice, and as such the
proper forum is the state court…”196
Along those lines, a finding that Dr. Carter had a duty to prescribe
a splint, but failed to do so, does not rise to the level of “cruel and
191

See id.
See id.
193
Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1996).
194
See generally Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended
(Aug. 25, 2016).
195
See generally id.
196
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (emphasis added).
192
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unusual punishment.”197 By extension, Dr. Carter admitting to this
duty and breach still does not create an Eighth Amendment claim, as
the Seventh Circuit has previously held that even admitted medical
malpractice is not sufficient to show that a doctor acted with deliberate
indifference.198 The majority attempted to offset this by further
qualifying their finding with the suggestion that Dr. Carter’s medical
decision “has no support in the medical community.”199 However, it
would be illogical for a reasonable jury to find that Dr. Carter’s
treatment decisions had no support in the medical community and
were such that “no minimally competent professional would have so
responded under those circumstances,” when the record contained
evidence that several other physicians treating Petties similarly
debated the necessity of a splint.200
1. Consideration of Cost, as a Factor in Medical Decision-Making, is
Not Necessarily Evidence of Deliberate Indifference
When deciding a course of treatment for any patient, a physician
considers many factors including risks, benefits, and cost. Casespecific facts are applied to these factors, and interpreted to come up
with an individualized plan of treatment. Consideration of cost is part
197

Cf. Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872 (1986) (“In a negligence medical
malpractice case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the following elements of a
cause of action: the proper standard of care against which the defendant physician's
conduct is measured; an unskilled or negligent failure to comply with the applicable
standard; and a resulting injury proximately caused by the physician's want of skill
or care.”).
198
McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 481 (7th Cir. 2013); Norfleet v. Webster,
439 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2006).
199
Petties, 836 F.3d at n. 2.
200
Petties v. Carter, 795 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2015), reh'g granted, 836 F.3d
722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). (“The district court granted the doctors' motion for
summary judgment. Dr. Carter's decision to wait eight weeks before immobilizing
Petties's ankle in a cast or boot could not have constituted deliberate indifference, the
court reasoned, because Petties's several physicians in and out of prison held
different opinions about whether a boot or cast had been necessary.”).
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of professional decision-making, and is not necessarily evidence of
deliberate indifference.
In fact, under the American Medical Association Code of Medical
Ethics, physicians are ethically required to “choose the course of
action that requires fewer resources when alternative courses of action
offer similar likelihood and degree of anticipated benefit compared to
anticipated harm for the individual patient but require different levels
of resources.”201
The Constitution does not entitle incarcerated individuals to all
suggested or possible medical treatment for a specific diagnosis
without cost consideration. Selecting a more cost-effective course of
treatment is not in and of itself deliberate indifference. For instance,
“ankle sprain” is the diagnosis used to describe a spectrum of
symptoms and intensities experienced by different patients suffering
from an ankle sprain. A patient with a mild sprain may be effectively
treated with rest, ice, compression and elevation, while a patient with a
more severe sprain might require a splint and physical therapy.202 It is
surely more cost effective, and in fact the treating physician’s duty as a
prudent steward of health care resources, to forgo the cost of a splint
for the patient with a mild sprain who can be effectively treated
through self-care.203
Disincentivizing cost-conscious decision-making pits physicians’
ethical obligations against their desire to avoid professional liability. In
practice, this might lead to overuse of tests and procedures, creating an
inefficient healthcare model, with little gain in benefit accompanied by
greatly increased costs.

201

Code of Medical Ethics, AMERICAN MED. ASS’N (2016), https://www.amaassn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-2016-ch11.pdf.
202
See Ankle Sprain, AMERICAN ORTHOPAEDIC FOOT & ANKLE SOCIETY,
http://www.aofas.org/footcaremd/conditions/ailments-of-the-ankle/pages/anklesprain-.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
203
Code of Medical Ethics, AMERICAN MED. ASS’N (2016), https://www.amaassn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-2016-ch11.pdf.
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2. State Medical Malpractice Law is Better Suited to Address Claims
of Deficient Medical Care
The Supreme Court, in Estelle, held that claims of substandard
care belong in state medical malpractice lawsuits.204 Specific to this
case, Petties did not allege that he received no care—he received
crutches, ice, pain medication and living accommodations. Rather, he
argued that he received poor care. This is a classic claim of medical
malpractice.
In disputes concerning adequacy of treatment, “federal courts are
generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to
constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”205 State
medical malpractice laws are often better equipped to evaluate these
claims by requiring the support of an expert familiar with the
specialty.206 The policy underlying this requirement is that experts
familiar with the field are able to testify that the defendant failed to
conform to the applicable standard of care for that field.207 However,
critics argue that retaining an expert may be prohibitively expensive
for an inmate.208 If the inmate cannot retain an expert, she cannot file a
medical malpractice action.209 The court is not authorized to offer
financial assistance to hire expert witnesses for inmates, as they are
not similarly authorized to do so for non-prisoners.210 Therefore, in
204

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1976).
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976); Layne v.
Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 474 (1st Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette
County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1979); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
1507 (11th Cir. 1991).
206
735 ILCS 5/2-622.
207
Ill. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. § 105.00 (citing Addison v. Whittenberg, 529
N.E.2d 552 (1988); Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872 (1986); Walski v. Tiesenga,
381 N.E.2d 279 (1978); Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975)).
208
See Chapman Law Group, supra note 25.
209
See 735 ILCS 5/2-622.
210
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915; Gaviria v. Reynolds, 476 F.3d 940, rehearing en
banc denied, certiorari denied (2007) (District court did not abuse its discretion, in
medical malpractice action brought against surgeons by patient/arrestee who had
205
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pursuing a state medical malpractice action, prison inmates are left to
pursue avenues such as contingency fee arrangements with plaintiffs’
attorneys.
There is no expert witness affidavit requirement for federal claims
of deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Unfortunately, this
leads to many frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against prison health
care workers that have no support in law or medicine.211 Furthermore,
prison physicians facing potential liability under the deliberate
indifference standard risk being held personally financially
accountable for the judgment, as insurers often do not cover deliberate
or intentional acts.212 The prospect of facing personal financial liability
may, in turn, serve as a disincentive for competent physicians, seeking
to protect themselves from liability, to avoid working in the prison
health care system. In the long term, disincentivizing competent
physicians from practicing in prisons may create lower quality and less
efficient prison healthcare system.
CONCLUSION
The defendants in Petties v. Carter have filed a petition for writ of
certiorari. Should the Supreme Court decide to hear argument on this
case, it presumably will be mindful that an essential purpose of
suffered broken jaw during arrest, by denying patient's motion to appoint expert
witness, even though patient qualified for appointment of counsel under in forma
pauperis statute and expert testimony was required for medical malpractice prima
facie case; appointed counsel, who specialized in medical malpractice claims, had
been unable to unearth substantiating evidence, and Bureau of Prisons' medical
evidence contradicted malpractice claim); Pedraza v. Jones, 71 F.3d 194 (1995)
(District courts have no authority to appoint expert witnesses to assist plaintiff
proceeding under in forma pauperis statute.); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468,
certiorari denied (1987) (There is no statutory authority to courts to authorize
payment of expert witness fees in civil suits for damages brought by indigents.).
211
See Chapman Law Group, supra note 25.
212
See e.g., Chapman Law Group, supra note 25; Harris, supra note 30; AHC
Media, Not all claims covered by med/mal policies,
https://www.ahcmedia.com/articles/64652-not-all-claims-covered-by-med-malpolicies (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
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summary judgment is to provide a method by which defendants can
curtail meritless claims at a relatively early stage as a matter of law.
This avenue of relief should surely be available to defeat wrongful
claims of “cruel and unusual punishment” brought by prisoners
displeased with the particulars of the medical treatment they received.
Such prisoners can and should be able to pursue standard medical
malpractice claims based on allegedly negligent medical services;
however, the fact that they are prisoners does not automatically create
a legitimate constitutional issue. It should be quite difficult to elevate
such prisoner claims into constitutional violations and, properly
understood, the “deliberate indifference” standard was intended to
address that by establishing a high hurdle.
Courts considering alleged violations of constitutional rights
should therefore not easily discount or second-guess the decisions of
medical professionals who have reasonably responded in some way to
the medical problems of prisoners. An imperfect tactical decision by
such a physician is substantially different than “deliberate
indifference” leading to “cruel and unusual punishment,” and in such
cases, the physician should be entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
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